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In the mid‐2000s, the flexicurity concept was developed
into a key EU policy concept. It drew its inspiration from
the Danish and Dutch practices to combine labor market
flexibility and security. However, the crisis' focus on bring-
ing down national deficits and debts left little room to
advance the concept. Lately, more emphasis has been
placed on the need to take into consideration the social
aspect of economic policy‐making. Current EU level docu-
ments see flexicurity as a guidance for structural reforms.
However, the European flexicurity initiatives seem never
to have had much impact in Denmark and the Netherlands.
There are few accounts of the recent adjustment to the
flexicurity models, be it at the EU or at national levels.
Therefore, this article assesses the fate of flexicurity by
scrutinizing its (adjusted) use as a political concept as well
as a socio‐economic model. Although the Danish flexicurity
model resembles the European flexicurity concept to a large
extent, recent reforms have, overall, weakened rather than
strengthened the flexicurity model. The Dutch flexicurity
model has a narrower focus on normalizing atypical work,
while recent reforms support this narrow flexicurity model.
Meanwhile, the EU level concept has been changing every
year, encompassing a growing number of issues.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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The concept of “flexicurity”, i.e., the combination of flexibility and security in the labor market, attracted a lot of atten-
tion in the year prior to the Great Recession which started in 2008. As such, flexicurity promises the best of two
worlds, and emphasizes that flexibility and security do not necessary have to be chosen between—they can be com-
bined (Wilthagen, 1998, pp. 98–202). At the EU level, the culmination was the Council of Ministers' adoption of a set
of “common flexicurity principles” in December 2007. However, much of the inspiration came from national levels,
especially from Denmark and the Netherlands. The concept itself originates from the Netherlands. One of the aims
of Dutch legislation introduced in the mid‐1990s was to provide part‐time and temporary employees with greater
security of employment. In relation to Denmark, the concept has been used to explain a positive dynamic generated
by liberal redundancy regulations, high unemployment benefits (UB), and active labor market policies (ALMP).
Since the Great Recession, the attention to the concept seems to have reduced somewhat, both in political
circles as well as among academics. At least, this is what is generally perceived (e.g., see Heyes, 2013, pp. 71–86),
although it has not been analyzed in any depth to see whether it really is so. Hence, the aim of this article is to
analyze the fate of flexicurity, reviewing the changes in its conceptualization as well as its implementation at the
EU level and at national levels.
The research question is: “To what extent and how has flexicurity—as a political concept as well as a socio‐economic
model—been affected by the Great Recession and post‐crisis reforms, and has the content of the concept and the
socio‐economic models changed?”.
Methodologically, the article draws upon the authors' previous research, secondary literature, as well as docu-
ment analyses and statistics. This introduction is followed by the development of the flexicurity concept at the EU
level, and two sections that look more closely to the Dutch and Danish cases in order to establish to what extent
these models have resisted the crisis and what other changes they have taken. The EU developments are used to mir-
ror the national policies developments, giving input to ideas of what countries could or should have done. The choice
for scrutinizing the fate of flexicurity in Danish and Dutch models is based on a crucial case selection, being most
likely to show a balanced flexicurity outcome, even after the crisis. We include the national institutional context
when judging how the flexicurity concept was adapted to the national level (Gallie, 2017). The fifth section presents
the findings and conclusions.2 | WHY DID THE EU FLEXICURITY CONCEPT EMERGE AND WHAT IS ITS
CONTENT?
2.1 | The process towards formulation of a European flexicurity concept
Flexicurity was a part of the European Employment Strategy from the very beginning (Keune, 2008). However, the
concept got its highest status when the Commission and some member states started to use the concept as a means
to bridge between a political coalition arguing for a more liberal socio‐economic regulation and a coalition arguing to
sustain or extent the regulation (Mailand, 2010).
The Commission drew inspiration from member states such as Denmark and the Netherlands, where flexicurity
could be said to already be reality. In early 2006, the Commission formulated a definition of flexicurity including four
“components”: “flexible and reliable contractual arrangements, effective active labor market policies, comprehensive
lifelong learning strategies and modern social security systems”. From the outset, the flexicurity concept—including
FIGURE 1 The adopted common European flexicurity principles—short form
Source. Council of the European Union (2007)
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phases of the process was especially on moving from job security to employment security, which was in line with one
of the Commission's aims, namely to counteract segmentation. However, this focus was also the main reason that
several member states and trade unions, especially from the south of Europe, were reluctant to embrace the concept,
at least in the early phase of the process (Bekker, 2011; Mailand, 2010).
The Commission's communication, which included the draft common principles, was published in June 2007.
But the draft principles had still to be adopted by the Council in December 2007. In this part of the decision‐making
process, further changes were made moving the initiative further away from the Commission's original focus, and
paying more attention to insiders on the labor market and the social partners (Bekker, 2011). In short, the most
important changes compared to the draft principles were: (1) there were no references to the flexicurity pathways
in the final version because some member states found them too prescriptive; (2) the references to insiders and out-
siders in the labor market (principles one and four) were removed; (3) in principle seven, about the importance of trust
and dialogue, the role of social dialogue was emphasized more strongly and the words “socially balanced policies”
were added (see Mailand, 2010).
In total, the changes were not path‐breaking, but they illustrate that to get everyone on board, the Commission's
original path had to be further adjusted. The result was a rather ambiguous concept, flexible enough to allow different
actors to read different goals and policies into it (Keune, 2008). See Figure 1.2.2 | The development from the crisis onwards
After the formative years of the European flexicurity concept, two major changes have influenced its further devel-
opment: the ending of the Lisbon Strategy and subsequent implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy (2010), and
the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis.
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increasing labor market participation and reducing structural unemployment, which, within the total package of the
Europe 2020 Strategy, hosts the most explicit reference to flexicurity. It calls to integrate the flexicurity principles
into national policies, so as to increase labor market participation, combat segmentation and inactivity, lower gender
inequality, and reduce structural unemployment. Although the 2015 revision changed guideline seven into enhancing
the functioning of labor markets, it keeps calling member states to take account of flexicurity principles.
While Europe 2020 thus incorporates the flexicurity approach, during the crisis years the concept disappeared to
the background. Fiscal and economic issues rapidly gained priority, resulting in stricter EU economic coordination,
including stricter depth and deficit rules. This impacted public expenditure severely, also affecting social security,
while structural labor market reforms were called for. Especially in the first years of the crisis this left little room
for the “security” part of flexicurity, viewing examples at the national level (Heyes, 2013, pp. 71–86; Murphy,
2017, pp. 308–327). At the same time, jobs were disappearing on a large scale.
However, from 2012 onwards a partial strengthening of the EU social dimension started, which might have to do
with the alarmingly high (youth) unemployment rates and rising poverty, feeding into recent plans to have a European
Pillar of Social Rights. The growing attention to the social dimension has provided the opportunity for the flexicurity
concept to re‐enter the EU policy debate. Its recurrence began carefully in the Five Presidents' Report on completing
the European Monetary Union (EMU) (EC, 2015). This report suggests a common standard for labor markets, which
should be developed as part of the completion of the EMU, entailing elements which are quite similar to the “old”
flexicurity ingredients (Bekker, 2018). The subsequent Commission Communication on steps towards completing
the EMU confirms this idea, while the Annual Growth Surveys of 2016 to 2018 provide more details.
Over time, all four flexicurity elements have been revised. Some have drifted away from the original wording,
while others have started resembling the original definition again. Remarkable are the oscillating views both on social
security and contractual arrangements (Bekker, 2018). This latter issue was also the most sensitive in the early stages
of the formulation of an EU flexicurity concept, a decade ago (see section 2.1). Developments to the concept reflect a
continuous search for combining flexible with reliable contracts and developing a new role for social security, being
“modern”, sustainable, and adequate throughout the life‐cycle of citizens.
The re‐emergence of the flexicurity concept at the EU level shows that also after the crisis more or less compre-
hensive ideas on balancing labor market flexibility and security are part of the toolkit. In this respect flexicurity has
managed to survive the crisis. The next sections establish how the flexicurity concept managed the crisis in Denmark
and the Netherlands, and whether the national developments mirror the EU level developments or not.3 | DENMARK
3.1 | Basic features and basic challenges of the Danish flexicurity model
The Danish combination of high employment rates, low unemployment, low inflation, steady growth rates, low levels
of inequality, and well‐developed social dialogue attracted attention around the turn of the millennium. A hypothesis
for explaining the strong labor market performance was at that time formulated as the Danish flexicurity model. In its
most commonly cited version it includes limited job protection, generous UB, and ALMP, which together is said to
create a mobile and transaction‐friendly labor market (e.g., see Madsen, 2006).1 See Figure 2.
Flexicurity is also claimed to have been benefitting weaker groups in the Danish labor market. The reasoning
includes the expectation that the limited job protection makes employers willing to run the risk of hiring such groups
more often than in non‐flexicurity countries, because the cost of redundancy would be lower. Hence, the flexicurity
model has also been used as an explanation for the comparatively low level of youth unemployment in Denmark.
Since the mid‐1990s, youth unemployment caused most concern in the years 2010–12, where it peaked. However,
youth unemployment increased less in relative terms than the overall unemployed, and even when it peaked at 14%
FIGURE 2 The Danish flexicurity model—The golden triangle
Source. Madsen (2006) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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education or training (NEETs) is among the lowest in Europe. Nevertheless, NEETs and drop‐out rates for youth edu-
cation do cause concern. Also, Denmark is no exception from the pattern where young people are overrepresented
among fixed‐term and part‐time employees (see Mailand, 2015; Figure 3).
However, from the outset there were a number of basic problems with the flexicurity model as a scientific
explanation. The flexicurity model often has been presented as covering all employees on the Danish labor market,
although in reality some are much more covered than others. The prototype flexicurity employee is the lower
qualified worker in the manufacturing industry and the construction sector, where terms of notice tend to be very
short and replacement rates high. Employees in other sectors—as well as non‐standard employees—seem to be less
covered by one or the other side of the model2 (see Larsen, Hansen, & Hansen, 2010; Mailand, 2006). Another prob-
lem was that although UB—measured by the replacement rates—are, rightly, comparatively generous in Denmark,
they are only so for the low‐income groups. For the mid‐ and high income groups, replacement rates are close toFIGURE 3 Temporary employees as a percentage of the total number of employees, by age [lfsa_etpga]
Source. Eurostat [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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administered by the trade unions, has been a way to de facto increase the replacement rates for the mid‐ and high
income groups (Mailand, 2015).
Another problem is linked to ALMP. The public budgets for ALMP are extremely high in Denmark (OECD, 2013),
thus supporting its emphasis in the flexicurity model. However, the employment effects of some of the more wide-
spread active measures used, such as job training in the public sector and education, have been seriously questioned
in a number of analyses, although the aggregate effect on ALMP seems to be positive (e.g., Det Økonomiske Råd,
2012). Hereby, it is also questioned how well ALMP work as a way back into employment for unemployed people.
Still, the flexicurity model is likely to have contributed to the high mobility and high level of job‐creation as well
as to the high subjective employment security (Ibsen, 2011; Madsen, 2014).3.2 | References of the concept and links to the European level
The reason that the Danish flexicurity model became a point of reference was maybe not only because of the
performance of the Danish labor market, but also because of the model's political appeal as a third way between
highly regulated and liberal labor market models. The attention paid to the flexicurity model peaked in the late 2000s.
Table 1 illustrates the part of the attention given by the Danish printed media.
Not only the media, but also all main labor market actors—governments, trade unions and employers organiza-
tions—signed up to the concept in the mid‐2000s, although some did so more enthusiastically than others. Former
liberal Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen liked the concept so much, for at least a period, that he wrongly
claimed to have invented it (Mailand, 2006). The trade unions were maybe more enthusiastic than the employers,
but also the employers referred to the concept occasionally—and still do, as the Danish Confederation of Employers'
EU political goals show (DA, 2017). Nevertheless, all three main actors used the concept more in international pre-
sentations than in national debates (e.g., CAOP, Reflect, Hans Böckler Stiftung, FAOS, & Labour Asociados, 2010,
p. 89). This might help to explain why a concept that attracted so much attention in international academic and policy
circles was not referred to more often in national printed media, even at its peak of attention (Table 1).
Furthermore, although the attention to the general flexicurity concept peaked around the formulation of
the European flexicurity concept, the latter has hardly been noticed in Denmark outside academia and narrow
ministerial circles.3.3 | The impact of the crisis and policy reforms on the flexicurity model
The economic crisis hit the Danish labor market hard, and unemployment more than doubled, although from a low
level around 3% of the labor force. International attention to the Danish flexicurity model weakened somewhat asTABLE 1 Number of references to the word “flexicurity” and “flexibility and security” in Danish and Dutch media,
by year
Keyword 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Flexicurity DK 73 189 236 215 219 220 133 169 124 109 120
NL 12 30 35 24 13 15 10 18 8 16 5
Flexibility and security DK 12 20 14 9 15 22 12 20 9 7 8
NL 28 31 68 17 6 29 14 47 34 12 5
Source. Denmark: http://informedia.dk/
Note. Web sources and television and radio are excluded. Only national newspapers, regional newspapers and newsletters,
organizational and other magazines are included.
Source. Netherlands: http://academic.lexisnexis.nl/
Note. Web sources and television and radio are excluded. Only national newspapers, regional newspapers, magazines (opin-
ions, professional), financial news. Keywords: “flexicurity” and “flexibiliteit en zekerheid”.
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Below, we present the post‐2008 reforms related to the four flexicurity dimensions—i.e., the three dimensions in
the Golden Triangle plus lifelong learning.
Contractual arrangements and numerical flexibility in Denmark are in the hands of the social partners and there-
fore not directly part of policy reforms. Although including collective agreements, not much has changed in relation to
contractual agreements in the post‐crisis period, but it is worth paying attention to the spread of severance payment,
which could be expected to decrease numerical flexibility. Severance payment has traditionally been limited in that
only few collective agreements—e.g., in the financial sector—have included it. However, in 2010 severance payment
was introduced in the manufacturing industry (Due & Madsen, 2010) and spread rapidly to other private sector col-
lective agreements. This development can be seen partly as a reaction to the crisis, and partly as a reaction to the
reduced income security caused by, inter alia, the 2010 reform (see below). Despite the introduction of severance
payment, close to nothing has changed regarding numerical flexicurity according to the Organisation for Economic
Co‐operation and Development's (OECD's) Employment Protection Legislation index, whereas, increasing numerical
flexibility due to post‐crisis reforms in a number of other EU countries implies that Denmark has moved from the top
to the middle group when it comes to numerical flexibility (OECD, 2014).
Lifelong learning—understood as policies addressing further education and training during the life course—has not
been reformed to any notable extent. A tripartite agreement from 2017 addressed a recent dramatic drop in the level
of use of further training (which, nevertheless, still stands at a comparatively high level). The tripartite agreement,
inter alia, allocates funds for lifting unskilled employees to the skilled level, tailoring the training more to the needs
of companies, and increasing the remuneration companies receive when employees takes part in further training
(Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2017). However, because the reform is so new the effect of it is uncertain, as would be
a classification of the reform as being “important”.
Regarding ALMP, only minor reforms have taken place post‐2008. In the decade prior to the crisis the ALMP sys-
tem as we know it today was gradually formed. In summary, this is a system where the municipal job‐centers have the
responsibility for the policy implementation, although within a tight national legal framework. Reforms in the 2000s
emphasized work‐first policies such as individual counselling, and demands regarding job‐seeking activity, but still left
comparatively wide scope for “human capital” instruments such as education and training and subsidized work
(job‐training) (Larsen & Mailand, 2007). During the first years after the crisis hit, some minor youth unemployment
and long‐term unemployment measures were introduced, and the short‐term work arrangement was, for a period,
used more than previously. Still, the ALMP policy mainly remained the same, also after the implementation of the lat-
est employment policy reform in 2014, the main aim of which was to simplify the action policy, get rid of “meaning-
less activation”, and support education as an activation measure. Nevertheless, it has to be added that changes have
taken place in policy implementation when it comes to the “intensity of activation” (the time the unemployed de facto
are taking part in some type of activation activity relative to period registered as unemployed), which was reduced
from 29% to 14% between 2011 and 2016 (Danske A‐kasser, 2017). Moreover, whereas no major “mainstream”
ALMP policy reforms can be pointed to, the reforms of disability pension and flexi‐jobs (2012) and sickness benefits
(2013) aim at getting people with a reduced capacity to work back into work with a combination of activation mea-
sures and “make work pay” measures (see below).
The only one of the four flexicurity dimensions that clearly includes important changes is the social security
dimension. Most importantly, an unemployment insurance reform from 2010 reduced the maximum unemployment
period from four to two years. Hereby, Denmark was no longer among the member states with the longest maximum
benefit periods. Moreover, the reform tightened the eligibility criteria. Although the reform did not change the level
of benefit and the replacement rates, income security was obviously reduced.
The reform was introduced by the liberal‐conservative government and its allied party in Parliament as well as a
party from the opposition, the social‐liberals. A tax reform from 2012 added to the anti‐flexicurity path by reducing
the level of indexation and thereby the replacement rates of the unemployment insurance as well as of other
social benefits. The expectation at that time was that the economic crisis would soon be over. According to the
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found a job. However, the government was proved wrong with regard to both estimates, and when a social
democratic/social‐liberal government came into power, changes were made in the 2012–14 reform. However,
these changes were a series of de facto temporary extensions of the maximum benefits periods, not a real change
to the reform. The social‐liberals had supported the 2010 reform and would not support a new reform including
permanent changes.
A UB commission was nevertheless established to formulate a new reform, which was signed in 2015 under a
new liberal government. The reform adjusted, rather than changed, the 2010 reform. It included, inter alia, more flex-
ible eligibility criteria by counting in short‐term temporary jobs, an opportunity to extend the maximum benefit
period by one year (if the persons had taken on sufficient employment during the benefit period), and reduced ben-
efit levels for new graduates without children. The more flexible eligibility criteria represent a small step to include
non‐standard employees, and could be seen as flexicurity “the Dutch way” (see below). The reform has gradually
been phased in and is estimated to reduce the number of persons exhausting the benefit period. Further changes
in social security with regard to non‐standard employment were made in 2017 with a minor UB reform focusing
on hybrid forms of work and self‐employment. They harmonize to some extent rules and regulations for employees
and self‐employed, and between the tax system and the social benefit system, and reduced administrative barriers
and burdens for persons combining incomes from employment and self‐employment. Still, like the 2015 reform,
the changes mildly adjust rather than change the 2010 reform.
In sum, the reform pattern post‐crisis shows no major changes with regard to three of the flexicurity dimensions,
but important changes regarding the fourth dimension on social security. Although the minor 2015 and 2017 legis-
lative changes show an increased concern for non‐standard employees, the dominant “philosophy” behind these
and the 2010 reform—and also the above‐mentioned reforms of disability pension and flexi‐job (2013) and of social
assistance (2014) as well as a social assistance reform (2015)—has not been flexicurity. Rather, it builds on the “make
work pay” philosophy of reduced benefit periods or benefit levels as a way back to the labor market, which in the
case of the disability and pension reform is combined with a belief in the value of activation measures regardless
of how much work capacity of the person in focus is reduced. This way of thinking in the post‐crisis period had sup-
port from both center‐left and liberal‐conservative governments, whereas the trade unions have remained partly
skeptical. Hence, the post‐crisis reforms in Denmark have rather weakened than strengthened the flexicurity model.
So, what is left of the flexicurity model? The problems and challenges of Danish flexicurity has increased in
recent years, but even during the height of the crisis (positive) features of the model were still working (see also
Madsen, 2014). Among them are high levels of job‐creation and job‐mobility. From 2008 to 2010 net job destruction
was 144,000 jobs, but although 492,000 were lost, 392,000 were created (Djøf, 2012)—and in the second quarter of
2012, 6.5% of employees had changed jobs within the last three months, which was the sixth highest figure in the EU
(Andersen, Mailand, & Ibsen, 2012; DA, 2012). Regarding unemployment, the relatively low level of youth unemploy-
ment has already been mentioned, but also long‐term unemployment has been relatively low. The ranking in EU was
the sixth lowest at its worst (2012) during the crisis, which could be explained by the high level of job‐creation and
again indicates that at least some of the presumed basic features of the Danish flexicurity model remain untouched.4 | THE NETHERLANDS
4.1 | Basic features and basic challenges of the Dutch flexicurity model
The Dutch flexicurity model has been designed to serve the hybrid goal of, on the one hand, increasing the security of
workers employed via atypical contracts (deviating from the standard open‐ended employment relationship), while,
on the other hand, preserving flexibility in the labor market. As such, the Dutch flexicurity model may be labelled
as normalizing atypical work (see Bovenberg, Wilthagen, & Bekker, 2008). The approach was codified in the Flexibility
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malizing atypical work was easily set. Comparing this Dutch flexicurity model with the pre‐crisis EU level flexicurity
concept, the Dutch model has a narrower approach, as it leaves out clear links with lifelong learning, ALMP, and ade-
quate and sustainable social security. Although all the elements exist in the Dutch labor market, and thus have an
impact on the balance between flexibility and security, the different elements are not purposely linked to each other.4.2 | References to the concept and links to the European level
Like in Denmark, Dutch media attention on the flexicurity concept was the highest in 2007, when EU level discussion
led to codifying flexicurity in common principles. However, given the rather low amount of references to it in printed
media, one can hardly speak of a “peak” of attention as is the case in Denmark (see Table 1). Instead, the loose term
“flexibility and security” has been used much more often in the Dutch debate, and this is related to discussion on the
Act Flexibility and Security (Wet Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid) of 1999. This Act is sometimes seen as one of the origins of
the flexicurity discussion at the EU level. Allegedly, the term was first used in speeches and interviews by the Dutch
sociologist Hans Adriaansens in the mid‐1990s in the context of this new Act (see Keune & Jepsen, 2007; Wilthagen,
1998, pp. 98–202). In 1996, a study under his supervision by the WRR (Dutch scientific council for government pol-
icy) used the word “flexicurity” as a new combination of flexibility and security (WRR, 1996). Afterwards, the term
was especially used in academic circles. Only after a long incubation period did the term enter the European labor
market agenda (Auer, 2010, pp. 371–386). Dutch media references to “flexibility and security” were the highest in
2007, when the Act Flexibility and Security was a source of inspiration for EU level policymakers. It was also men-
tioned in 2012–13, during political discussions on altering the Act in order to get a better balance between flexibility
and security (see section 4.4).4.3 | The impact of the crisis on the flexicurity model
The European Commission's claim has been confirmed that the Dutch flexicurity model corresponds to a labor market
that has weathered the first years of the crisis. Until 2012, the Dutch labor market seemed relatively healthy, with
unemployment rising from 2% in the third quarter of 2008 to 3.8% in the third quarter of 2010 (Eurostat data). Actu-
ally, employers welcomed a more relaxed labor market after years of labor shortages. Unfilled vacancies could be
filled, and companies continued hoarding labor in expectation of future labor shortages stemming from the aging
of society (see CPB, 2011).
Only in 2012 did the unemployment rate start to exceed 5%, after which the Netherlands faced difficulties get-
ting unemployment rates down for a number of years. Unemployment rose to 7.4% in 2014, decreased slowly to
6.9% in 2015, but is now going down rapidly to 4.9% in 2017 (Eurostat data). Although not always an employment
“top model”, the Commission's evaluation that flexicurity countries managed to preserve employment may be accu-
rate. However, one could argue whether the Netherlands has also been able to preserve a fair distribution between
flexibility and security over different groups of workers.
A rapidly growing number of fixed‐term employment contracts has not only resulted in more labor market
flexibilization, but also started to segment the labor market. This segmentation is perhaps not as severe as in some
other EU countries, yet, also in the Netherlands people have been facing longer periods in temporary jobs with
decreasing chances to move on to more stable employment. Within the entire workforce the incidence of temporary
employment has risen from 17.9% in 2007 to 20.6% in 2016.3 For young people aged 15–29 these rates are much
more dramatic, where a 37% temporary employment in 2007 has increased to 46.4% in 2014 (Figure 3). This means
that almost half of the under 30‐year‐olds have a temporary employment contract. For 44.4% of these employees
with temporary contracts, the reason for having temporary employment contracts is that they could not find perma-
nent employment, whereas 41.4% say the contract type relates to a probationary period. Apparently, employers use
temporary contracts as a hiring tool. Although the normalization of flex work means that it is not necessarily harmful
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rary contracts would move into steady jobs after a while. However, this stepping‐stone effect has become less and
less valid viewing the declining transition rates into open‐ended jobs. Eurofound (2015) speaks of a Dutch year‐to‐
year transition rate of much less than 20% in 2012, making the Netherlands the second worst performing EU coun-
try. Thus, the Dutch model does not necessarily lead to a good performance in terms of a fair distribution of flexibility
and security. National legislation is seen as a cause of the high and growing amount of temporary employment and
self‐employed, as it determines the differences in costs and risks for employers between flexible and open‐ended
employment relations (see CPB, 2016a).
In spite of the fact that the Dutch aim was to normalize atypical employment, open‐ended employment contracts
tend to give employees extra benefits, including a higher chance of engaging in training and work‐related education.
Furthermore, temporary employment is associated with lower average wages, lower job autonomy, and underutiliza-
tion of knowledge and capacities of workers (Muffels, 2013). In the long‐run, these cumulative disadvantages make
temporary employment less attractive to workers. Eurofound (2015) calculates that Dutch temporary workers have
one of the highest wage gaps within the EU: more than 20%. For employers, an open‐ended employment contract
means taking on certain “risky” obligations such as employees being progressively entitled to severance payment
in case of redundancy and an obligation to keep paying salary during the first two years of an employee's illness. Only
after these two years may the employee become entitled to a public work incapacity payment.
The attractiveness of exploring ways to keep employment outside the traditional open‐ended employer‐
employee relationship has also stimulated the rise of solo self‐employment and the invention of payrolling construc-
tions. The latter construction outsources the legal employer‐ship, creating a triangular employment relation between
the employee, the payrolling company, and the company with the job vacancy. The legal employer is the payrolling
company, which thus takes on the risks of illness or dismissal. Still, the payrolling company is little more than an
employer “on paper”. The employee is selected by, and gets assignments from, the company which offers the job.4.4 | Recent policy reforms: Rebalancing flexibility and security?
Regarding contractual arrangements, and contrary to Denmark, the Netherlands has made large reforms during the
past few years. The growing incidence and variety of atypical employment relations has been a main reason for
the 2015 Act Work and Security. The Act aims at rebalancing flexibility and security by improving the legal security
of different kinds of flex workers, while making the redundancy of workers with an open‐ended contract faster,
cheaper, and fairer. Thus, unlike the former Act Flexibility and Security, the new Act also amends the position of
workers with an open‐ended employment contract. The contours of the Act Work and Security have been discussed
with and by the social partners, and large parts of it were included in a social accord reached by the government and
the social partners in 2013. Restricting abusive forms of flexible work were motivated also by court rulings obliging to
pay on‐call workers for at least three hours per call and questioning payrolling constructions (Dekker, Bekker, &
Cremers, 2017, pp. 189–212).
The main changes in the part of employment protection legislation, as implemented by the Act Work and
Security, entail the introduction of a transition allowance (transitievergoeding). All workers, also with temporary
employment contracts, get this transition allowance if they have been employed by the same employer for at least
two years. The allowance may be used for schooling and for moving into another job, and its level depends on tenure.
This allowance is usually lower than the former redundancy payment for open‐ended contracts. The expectation is
that on average redundancy will be cheaper.
Another change aiming to reduce inequality is that employers can no longer choose via which “route” (Public
Employment Service [PES] or court) the worker is made redundant. In court, employees often get severance pay,
whereas PES hardly ever decides to grant severance payment. Dismissals on economic grounds are now automati-
cally judged by PES, whereas redundancies on personal grounds appear before court, which should make the system
fairer. For workers with a temporary employment contract, insecurity is reduced by shortening the time frame within
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better protection, having the same level of employment protection as employees who have a direct employment rela-
tionship with their employer. Moreover, the long‐term use of on‐call contracts (zero hours) is limited. In spite of these
legislative changes, the Dutch Parliament keeps expressing concerns about the insecurities that Dutch atypical
workers face.
Similar to Denmark, there have been no major reforms regarding lifelong learning in the Netherlands. The govern-
ment introduced a lifelong learning credit in 2017, enabling people up to the age of 55 to borrow money in order to
pay for study fees. Also, the tripartite national social partners reaffirmed the relevance of lifelong learning in a recent
opinion (SER, 2017). Overall, the Netherlands performs well on lifelong learning compared to other EU countries,
although the amount of people engaging in training has been stable for decades, and the access to lifelong learning
seems less evident for vulnerable groups such as low‐skilled and atypical workers (SCP, 2016).
What is much more interesting is that the Dutch model of normalizing flexible employment, without a deliberate
policy link with social security, seemed to be continued. The Act Work and Security was developed in a context of
pressures to reduce public expenditure, cutting budgets for re‐integration activities, and reducing UB.
Whereas Denmark introduced small reforms to ALMP, the Dutch system did see a major change, which may be
summarized as decentralization and budget cuts. Thus, the changes were not so much substantive, but rather con-
cerned changing the governance structure, leaving fewer responsibilities for the national level and giving the munic-
ipalities larger roles in providing income and reintegration support. Yet, decentralization was tied to major budget
cuts, decreasing drastically the money available to PES and municipalities to offer re‐integration services. Eurostat
data shows that prior to the crisis, the Netherlands ranked second in terms of ALMP expenditure as a percentage
of gross domestic product (GDP), right after Denmark, which was first in the ranking (CPB, 2016b). By 2013, the
Netherlands dropped on the list to sixth place. Expenditure on ALMP reduced by 50% between 2002 and 2013, leav-
ing it at 0.8% of GDP. The legislator argued that support at the local level will be more efficient, as municipalities have
specific knowledge about regional labor markets and its jobseekers. This was one of the justifications to reduce public
spending in this domain. However, compared to other EU countries, there seem to be few funds to guide and coach
people towards work or to invest in longer‐lasting schooling and training of long‐term unemployed (CPB, 2016b).
Regarding social security, the most notable change was the gradual reduction of the length of UB from a
maximum of 38 months in 2015 to 24 months in 2019, and the length continues to depend on job tenure. Social
partners may agree on giving an additional 12 months of UB in their collective labor agreements. Other changes in
social security have been targeted to the most vulnerable groups in society and aimed to get them in a regular job
(Borghouts‐van de Pas & Freese, 2017).5 | CONCLUSIONS
The aim of the article has been to answer the research question: “To what extent and how has flexicurity—as a political
concept as well as a socio‐economic model—been affected by the Great Recession and post‐crisis reforms, and has the
content of the concept and the socio‐economic models changed?”.
We have found that, with inspiration from countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands, a flexicurity concept
was developed at the EU level in the second half of the 2000s. This concept included four elements, namely, flexible
and reliable contractual arrangements, effective ALMP, comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, and modern social
security systems. However, only after concessions were given to skeptical member states and trade unions, could
eight ambiguous common principles referring to these four elements be adopted. After the outbreak of the crisis,
the Commission succeeded in holding on to the concept as part of Europe 2020, although less attention was paid
to it at the expense of the EU's new economic governance. From around 2012—with the socialization of the
European Semester—the concept seems to have experienced a partial revival at the EU level. At the same time,
the concept has undergone changes.
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(generous UB), high numerical flexibility, and ALMP—resembles the EU flexicurity concept to a large extent. The
Danish economy and the labor market were hit hard and fast by the crisis. Reforms, especially regarding unemploy-
ment insurance, have overall weakened rather than strengthened the flexicurity model. With regard to ALMP,
contractual arrangements, and lifelong learning, major reforms have not taken place since the crisis. However,
increasing numerical flexibility in a number of other EU countries implies that Denmark has moved from the top to
the middle group with regard to OECD‐indicators for numerical flexibility. Nevertheless, parts of the flexicurity model
seem still to work, as illustrated by continuous high levels of job‐creation and job‐mobility and low levels of youth
unemployment and long‐term unemployment. The flexicurity concept is still referred to in the media, but less often
than prior to the crisis.
The Dutch flexicurity model has a narrower focus on normalizing atypical work. The Dutch economy and labor
market were not hit as hard by the crisis as those of Denmark. While Dutch unemployment rose to close to 7% in
2015, it has decreased ever since, and labor shortages are re‐emerging. Atypical work has been normalized to some
extent, but covers a large part of the labor force. Thus, whereas the Netherlands seems to have resisted the crisis
fairly well in terms of employment, labor market segmentation is posing serious challenges to the degree of “fairness”.
Contrary to the situation in Denmark, recent reforms support the flexicurity model, especially seeking to find new
balances in the first flexicurity dimension of contractual arrangements, and still assuming that people will make the
transition into an open‐ended employment contract after some time. Other reforms have focused on budget cuts
for ALMP combined with more difficult access, or lower entitlements, to social security for certain groups. As in
Denmark, lifelong learning has not really been an aspect in Dutch reforms.
Future evaluations of Dutch and Danish labor markets will show to what extent these countries will (need to)
incorporate choices for a stronger social dimension into their everyday practices. As yet, the largest reforms in Danish
social security and Dutch ALMP have been driven more by austerity and “work‐first” demands than by concerns of
adjusting systems to the needs of citizens throughout the life cycle, as the EU lately seems to suggest. Will the coun-
tries need to start learning from the EU's policy‐advices, or will they keep being a model for others to follow?
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ENDNOTES
1 A newer version of the model has changed it into a square by including the voluminous vocational and further education
system (e.g., Madsen, 2014).
2 It has been widely assumed that public sector employees in Denmark have a higher job‐protection than private sector
employees, but this has been questioned in a recent study.
3 Labelled by Eurostat as employees with temporary contracts, who are those who declare themselves as having a fixed
term employment contract or a job which will terminate if certain objective criteria are met, such as completion of an
assignment or return of the employee who was temporarily replaced.
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